



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DATE: 5 JUN 1980 REVIEWED: 


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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7 NOVEMBER 1959

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


USSR presses Britain on question of Laotian trials.

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Registration of Koreans in Japan for repatriation to North Korea proceeding smoothly.

Algerian rebel leaders reported pessimistic on prospects for negotiated peace.

Pressure mounts in Sudan for return to civilian government.




### III. THE WEST

⑤ Cyprus constitution commission again working cooperatively; may soon resolve deadlock on vice-presidential powers.

### LATE ITEM

⑥ Soviet anniversary speech hails Khrushchev's leadership in peace offensive.



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25X1

7 November 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*NO*

USSR-Laos: The USSR is increasing diplomatic pressure on Britain to try to persuade the Laotian Government to drop plans for the trial of 14 Neo Lao Hak Zat leaders. In a conversation with British Under Secretary of State Profumo on 2 November, Soviet Ambassador Malik twice said he wished especially to draw attention to Communist China's position as expressed in its note published on 31 October. This note warned that the trials would "inevitably block the way to a peaceful solution." Malik stressed that the planned trials would be "provocative and would give rise to a very tense situation." The Foreign Office interprets Malik's remarks as a "clear warning that the Chinese would cause trouble in Laos if the trials were held."

*JE*

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*NO*

Japan-North Korea: Registration of Korean residents in Japan for repatriation to North Korea is proceeding smoothly and the quota of 5,000 for the first five shipments will easily be filled. The first shipment will be in mid-December. The pro-Communist Korean residents' federation is apparently screening prospective applicants for skills and political reliability and designating those who are to register. The favorable treatment which the first repatriates will probably receive in North Korea will almost certainly be publicized in such a way as to encourage more of the 700,000 Koreans in Japan to opt for repatriation.

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OK  
Algeria: The "violent reaction" of French settlers in Algeria to De Gaulle's self-determination program has reportedly made rebel leaders pessimistic about the prospects for a negotiated peace. The rebels plan no action prior to De Gaulle's press conference scheduled for 10 November, but are apprehensive that he may at that time offer concessions to the "ultras" which will preclude negotiations. The Algerians probably hope that pressure can be put on France during the UN debate on Algeria, probably in late November.)

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Sudan: Important political and religious elements are intensifying pressure on the Abboud military regime for a return to civilian government and lifting of bans on political and labor-union activities. Railroad workers in the Khartoum north railway yards and Khartoum university students struck in support of these demands on 2 and 4 November, and larger strikes are reportedly being planned. Leaders of the powerful Ansar religious sect and of the major political parties, as well as the Communists, are also encouraging public suspicions that the recent Nile waters agreement with the UAR actually amounts to a sellout of Sudanese interests.

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### III. THE WEST

OK  
Cyprus: The commission charged with writing a constitution for the new Cypriot republic is proceeding toward its goal in an atmosphere which has again become cordial and cooperative, and the three-month deadlock over the powers of the Turkish Cypriot vice president may soon be resolved. The recent challenge to Archbishop Makarios' authority by the mayors of the island's largest towns probably will not affect the anticipated election of Makarios as the republic's first president; Cypriot Communists, however, will attempt to exploit this division in nationalist ranks.

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7 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEM

OK  
\*USSR Anniversary: The keynote speech on the eve of the October Revolution anniversary, traditionally a confident review of the USSR's domestic and international situation, this year focussed heavily on Moscow's current peace offensive. The speaker paid effusive compliments to Khrushchev's leadership, crediting him with the fact that "the international situation has noticeably improved of late." In noting the occasion in Peiping, the Chinese expressed general solidarity with Moscow, but continued to give evidence of misgivings about the USSR's current international line. The Soviet speaker's references to economic progress contained the frankest admission yet of this year's mediocre grain harvest. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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7 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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### Algerian Rebels Apprehensive Over Rightist Pressure on De Gaulle

(The "violent reaction" of French settlers in Algeria to De Gaulle's self-determination program has made the rebels pessimistic concerning prospects for a negotiated peace, [REDACTED])

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25X1 [REDACTED] The rebels are said to plan no moves prior to De Gaulle's 10 November press conference, but are apprehensive that he may then offer concessions to the right which will preclude cease-fire talks on terms acceptable to the Algerians.

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[REDACTED] The rebels are probably favorably disposed toward negotiations whether or not De Gaulle is prepared to offer concessions beyond his 16 September proposals. In view of the army and settler opposition to De Gaulle's program, however, the rebels may feel that international opinion--particularly in the course of the UN debate on Algeria expected in late November--affords the best leverage for bringing about early talks with the French.

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### Increasing Pressures on Sudanese Government

The Abboud military regime's control over Sudan is becoming weaker. Important political and religious elements, usually antagonistic toward each other, now are making common cause in demanding the return of civilian government and freedom to resume political and labor union activities. Railroad workers in the Khartoum north railway yards struck in support of these demands on 2 November, and the government fired 238 of them. The government closed Khartoum university indefinitely after a student strike on 4 November. Plans are reportedly being made for walkouts on a larger scale, possibly leading to a general strike.

Leaders of the powerful Ansar religious sect and of the major political parties, as well as the Communists, are stepping up their efforts to foment anti-Abboud sentiment. Their latest tactic is to encourage suspicions that the government's recently achieved, favorable Nile waters settlement with the UAR actually amounts to a sellout of Sudanese interests.

Even if the Abboud government manages to hold firm against these growing pressures, its embroilment with civilian opponents may provide an opening for junior army officers [redacted]

[redacted] (As antipathy toward the Abboud regime spreads, the junior officers will stand a better chance of lining up additional support among well-placed civilians and key army personnel in the Khartoum area.) [redacted]

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### Progress Seen on Cyprus Negotiations

The work of the Cyprus constitutional commission, an organization composed of representatives from Greece, Turkey, and the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, is proceeding in an unexpected atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation, according to the American consul general in Nicosia. The remaining areas of dispute have been described by the Turkish representative as extremely narrow, while the chairman of the Greek Cypriot delegation is also optimistic. These statements contrast with recent reports of intercommunal tension on Cyprus following the interception of a Turkish boat attempting to smuggle arms onto the island.

The major issue which has deadlocked negotiations since early August involves the powers of the Turkish Cypriot vice president of the future republic. The basic Cyprus agreement is subject to conflicting interpretation of the vice president's executive powers--particularly his right to veto legislation. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots have insisted on restricting this veto power to those issues specifically mentioned in the agreement. Representatives from Ankara, supported by Turkish Cypriot leaders, have demanded power wide enough to make the vice president virtually co-president.

The authority of Archbishop Makarios, meanwhile, is being challenged by the six Greek Cypriot mayors. Their denunciation of Makarios as a "dictator" and their open opposition to the Cyprus settlement are not expected to affect seriously Makarios' position in the Greek community or his election as first president of the new republic. The "mayors' revolt," led by the nationalist mayor of Nicosia, has given the well-organized Communist party on the island an opportunity to exploit division in Greek Cypriot nationalist ranks.

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LATE ITEM

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Soviet Anniversary Celebration

In his keynote speech on the eve of the 42nd anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Averky Aristov, one of the 14 members of the ruling Communist party presidium, struck the traditional tone of poised optimism. In its outline, the relatively short speech followed closely the main lines of Khrushchev's 31 October speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Aristov was fulsome in his praise of Khrushchev as leader and policy maker, missing few opportunities to pay a compliment to the domestic and foreign policies associated with the Khrushchev regime. Amidst the conventional optimistic review of economic and technological accomplishments, however, Aristov indicated that this year's grain harvest may fall even shorter than last year's record output than previously conceded. In fact, this year's grain crop may be the lowest since Khrushchev's agricultural reforms began in 1954.

Aristov stated that the current grain crop would be better than those of the good years before the New Lands expansion. This statement, examined against an analysis of crop data for previous years, means that the harvest will be only about three-quarters of last year's officially claimed record crop of 141,200,000 tons. Aristov's admission, since he could have sidestepped the problem, may be an indication that vigorous measures to improve agriculture will be taken at the party plenum on agriculture scheduled to convene later this month.

In his statements on foreign policy, Aristov reiterated Khrushchev's 31 October assessment of a "noticeable improvement" in the international situation. He also characterized Khrushchev's visit to the US as a "model and live example" of the practice of peaceful coexistence and assigned top priority to disarmament as the "most urgent issue for mankind."

Although it dwelled heavily on the significance of Khrushchev's American tour, the keynote speech, possibly as a further sign of coolness in Sino-Soviet relations, omitted even the barest reference to Moscow's Chinese ally. For their part, the Chinese, noting the anniversary in Peiping, reaffirmed their solidarity with the USSR and expressed Peiping's willingness to "work for the complete realization" of Moscow's peace initiatives. Signs of Chinese reservations appeared, however, in politburo member Peng Chen's call for continued vigilance against the "war-like imperialist circles in the US" and for an "uncompromising struggle against revisionists."

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**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

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The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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